Objection to Euthypro Dilemma's Answer

[Youssarian]

A skeptic raised the Euthyphro dilemma, and I responded by saying that morality comes from God's character. He linked to this site. Specifically, this passage caught my eye:

The claim that God would not command evil because it goes against God's nature does not actually change the problem, but only reorganizes it. The question might then be reasonably asked, "Where does God's nature come from?" Did God create it himself? If so then God's whims are still behind what he considers right and wrong, and the dilemma still applies. If, on the other hand, God did not create his own nature, then either someone else created it (in which case the dilemma applies to the creator of God's nature) or the morality contained in God's nature is inherent in some way (in which case God is not truly the author of right and wrong).

Michael Martin has argued that theistic objections to the dilemma solve nothing, because it can easily be reformulated in terms of God's character: "Is God's character the way it is because it is good or is God's character good simply because it is God's character?" The structure of this modified dilemma is exactly the same as before, and it appears to be if anything harder to escape.

If we identify the ultimate standard for goodness with God's nature, then it seems we are identifying it with certain of God's properties (e.g., being loving, being just). If so, then the dilemma resurfaces: is God good because he has those properties, or are those properties good because God has them?

How would you respond to this?

[chisel]

A skeptic raised the Euthyphro dilemma, and I responded by saying that morality comes from God's character. He linked to this site. Specifically, this passage caught my eye:



How would you respond to this?

Not sure if this'll be helpful or not, but these are my thoughts.
Euthyphro's dilemma attempts to argue that morality is either arbitrary (whatever God decides is moral becomes moral) or that God is obeying a higher law, which would bring into doubt God's superiority.

If morality is grounded in God's nature and God's nature is unchanging, then morality cannot be arbitrary.
Since God's nature isn't superior to God, but is essentially part of God, it cannot be superior to God.

One can stop right here since Ethryphro's dilemma has been shown to be a false dilemma.

Instead of really dealing with the Christian response, it seems the skeptic is instead push back the problem to a higher level leading to a non-sensical question. This is the same move as saying, "who made God?" If God is by definition the uncreated Creator then asking "who created the uncreated?" is rather silly. It doesn't deal with the Christian view at all, but simply ignores it in favour of a strawman version of God who isn't uncreated, but created.

Likewise asking "Where does God's nature come from?" inplies that somehow God's nature hasn't always been part of God, but instead came into being at some point. But why should one entertain such a notion, given that if God is uncreated, then His essential properties (such as His nature) will also be uncreated. The question becomes silly.

Then other option the skeptic provides is, "If ... God did not create his own nature, then either someone else created it"

Are these really the only two options? "Either God created His nature Himself or someone else created?"
A much more reasonable third options is, as I said, that God's nature has always been part of God Himself. If God has always existed then why isn't that a valid option?

Onto the Michael Martin's argument:
Asking "Is God's character the way it is because it is good?" can be rephrased as "Is God's character grounded in morality?"
Surely if we say "Morality is grounded in God's character", then it cannot be that God's character is grounded in morality. So this option isn't valid.

The second option that Michael Martin offers is, "Is God's character good simply because it's God's character?"
Let's take away the word "simply" from that question since it adds nothing to the argument other than rhetorical effect.

Now the question reads, "Is God's character good because it's God's character?"
I'd say yes. If we say that morality is grounded in God's character then goodness is whatever corresponds with God's character. What's the problem?
Since God's character is unchanging, then goodness is objectively rooted in something unchanging and universal. The word "simply" attempts to diminish this fact for no good reason.

I haven't read the full article, but none of the responses seem to succeed in re-establishing Euthyphro's dilemma as a real dilemma.

You could probablly at this point throw the ball back into the atheist's court.
How does atheism deal with the question of morality? Is morality simply whatever we've evolved to consider moral? In that case we could have easily have evolved a different set of moral standards if we could turn back the clock. Even worse we could be evolving a different set of morals right now. Just because we're a social species today, why ought individuals behave socially tomorrow?
If morality is merely subjective preference, then it becomes arbitrary, which is kinda what Euthyphro's dilemma attempts to show as a bad thing, and one would agree that it is bad.
On the other hand if there is a standard for morality that is objective, or higher than mankind, how does atheism account for such a thing without a transcendent moral law giver?

[one_lost_coin]

Its really very simple. The person who posed this supposed dilemma does not understand what evil is.

For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing. - St. Thomas Aquinas

Evil is not a thing but a wrong choice, or the damage done by a wrong choice. Evil is no more a positive thing than blindness is. But it is just as real. It is not a thing, but it is not an illusion..

Second, the origin of evil is not the Creator but the creature's freely choosing sin and selfishness. Take away all sin and selfishness and you would have heaven on earth. Even the remaining physical evils would no longer rankle and embitter us. Saints endure and even embrace suffering and death as lovers embrace heroic challenges. But they do not embrace sin. - Peter Kreeft

Now with a corrected understanding of evil run it through the supposed dilemma and it fallacy is revealed.

[Athanasius]

A skeptic raised the Euthyphro dilemma, and I responded by saying that morality comes from God's character. He linked to this site. Specifically, this passage caught my eye:

How would you respond to this?

Well, I would link him to a Google page, of course...
...No I wouldn't, but really what's the point of talking to someone who's only going to refer to other people? On a serious note:

My first response would be: interesting how the Euthyphro dilemma, initially posed by Socrates to demonstrate the issue of piety and holiness in a polytheistic religion (primarily in relation to disagreement between the gods), has been hijacked in an attempt to discredit morality in relation to monotheistic religion, particularly Christianity.

My second response would be: as it is incontrovertible that God's nature was not created by God (which would require either (1) God to change or (2) God to exist before God existed), but rather is inherent to God (that is, God's nature has always been God's nature, in exactly the way God's nature has always been), then it is not at all obvious that this entails that God is 'not truly the author of right and wrong'. It would entail, only, that right and wrong exist in relation to God's character, and there's nothing problematic about this explanation. If there is, your interlocutor will have to explain why s/he thinks so.

My third response (to Michael Martin) would be: 'what is good?' If goodness is rooted in God's character, then God's character is good because it is good. This does not entail, however, that anything God did would be good de facto. This seems a confusion between God's character and God's actions. If God were to perform any act which was not good, then he would not be God and his character would not be good.

My fourth response (to the third argument presented) would be: 'what is good?'

At some point there are no further explanations for why a thing is the way it is, and the real problem here is people keep asking 'why' when there are no whys to be asked. They really shouldn't call it the Euthyphro dilemma...