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rationalist
Oct 8th 2008, 02:01 PM
Does predestination make everything else worthless? What I mean by this is that God's love was so great and good that he gave us free will. But if some of us are predestined to be saved and some are not then free will really either doesnt exist or is useless. I have a hard time beleiving in predestination because it interferes with God's goodness. However it is hard to dispute predestination because of God's power. He is all knowing therefore he knows before we are even created that we are going to be saved or not. If we are predestined then the bible and its teaching are only for the predestined saved. :B This is a whirlwind in my head. :giveup:

CFJ
Oct 8th 2008, 03:49 PM
Does predestination make everything else worthless? What I mean by this is that God's love was so great and good that he gave us free will. But if some of us are predestined to be saved and some are not then free will really either doesnt exist or is useless. I have a hard time beleiving in predestination because it interferes with God's goodness. However it is hard to dispute predestination because of God's power. He is all knowing therefore he knows before we are even created that we are going to be saved or not. If we are predestined then the bible and its teaching are only for the predestined saved. :B This is a whirlwind in my head. :giveup:

Hi rationalist,

Maybe the following thread could be helpful. Your problem is with predestination, but this guy have found free-will to be problematic. The opposite though, but in a special way similar and the exact same issues with God...

http://bibleforums.org/showthread.php?t=26436&highlight=jumping+cliff

drew
Oct 8th 2008, 05:21 PM
However it is hard to dispute predestination because of God's power. He is all knowing therefore he knows before we are even created that we are going to be saved or not
If you are asserting that God's foreknowledge that a person will be saved implies that such a person has also pre-destined to be saved, that would be incorrect reasoning. The arguments about this are notoriously subtle and I am not sure whether I have the time to get into them.

For what its worth, I used to firmly believe that foreknwoledge necessitates pre-destination. And by a long tortuous route, I am now quite convinced that this is simply not the case.

John146
Oct 8th 2008, 05:24 PM
Does predestination make everything else worthless? What I mean by this is that God's love was so great and good that he gave us free will. But if some of us are predestined to be saved and some are not then free will really either doesnt exist or is useless. I have a hard time beleiving in predestination because it interferes with God's goodness. However it is hard to dispute predestination because of God's power. He is all knowing therefore he knows before we are even created that we are going to be saved or not. If we are predestined then the bible and its teaching are only for the predestined saved. :B This is a whirlwind in my head. :giveup:Feel free to read through this ongoing thread regarding Predestination and see what you think: http://bibleforums.org/showthread.php?t=140388

ConservChrist
Oct 8th 2008, 05:27 PM
Predestination isnt actually a fact. Because God is all knowing, people tend to believe in predestination. But, just because God knows, doesn't mean He pre determined.
Yes, He knows that John will be saved but his brother Jake will not. BUT God did not make it that way, He only knew it to be that way. Jake still had the same choice. Adam and Eve also had a choice, but they made the wrong one. God knew it, but he didn't cause it. Also, Cain and Abel, God knew, but didn't cause. Or even with Judas. Jesus knew, but didn't cause it to happen.

So all in all, just because God knows one thing, doesn't mean He intended for it to happen that way.
Jesus was sent to die for ALL.
For God so loved the WORLD that He send His One and only Son....

The salavation God offers is to all. Most will not choose it though. God knows that. But is still offered to everyone.

legoman
Oct 8th 2008, 06:26 PM
If God foreknows an event will happen, then that event will happen. Thats what foreknowledge means. Because God knows the event will happen, the event is destined to happen.

Therefore, the presence of foreknowledge of event A, means that event A is predestined.

Example: God knows tomorrow I will do A. Therefore tomorrow I will do A. I am destined to do A tomorrow.

God doesn't even need to predestine event A himself. The existence of his foreknowledge effectively predestines event A.

This should be simple stuff folks. I have yet to see a logical argument about how it cannot be this way.

Additional discussion here on "The One Timeline":
http://bibleforums.org/showthread.php?t=141686

Legoman

Biblebelt
Oct 8th 2008, 06:57 PM
I’m a staunch believer in predestination. What I see is that God set everything up for a purpose. If man is in any way in control nothing has a purpose. What can man purpose for man in eternity when he isn’t God? Nothing. Man has no free will any more than the earth has a free will to orbit the sun. If the earth did have free will to orbit the sun, it would just be doing it’s own thing without a purpose. No, God set the earth in motion and He didn’t just know it would orbit the sun, but He made it do that very thing. God set the earth in motion and stocked it with humans and animals and He has appointed the seasons, cold and heat, seed time and harvest and day and night while the earth remains, all for His own purpose and glory.

Humans are nothing more than lumps of clay in the hands of the potter that He moulds for His purpose, some to honour and some to dishonour. I say again, man has no free will. I am where I am because circumstances were such that I arrived where I am because of God’s decree to fulfil His purpose. God decrees everything that happens and nothing will resist His decree.

Romans 9:17-20 17 For the scripture saith unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. 18 Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. 19 Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? 20 Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?

The Gospel isn’t “what will you do with Jesus”, but “what will He do with you”? Sobering thought.

John146
Oct 8th 2008, 07:42 PM
If God foreknows an event will happen, then that event will happen. Thats what foreknowledge means. Because God knows the event will happen, the event is destined to happen.I believe you are turning a word that is intended to mean "knowledge of something beforehand" into "to cause something to happen beforehand". You are making the word foreknowledge out to mean nothing different than the word predestination, but Paul indicates that the words mean something different by saying that those God foreknew He also predestined to be conformed to the image of Christ.

If to foreknow something and to predestine something mean the same thing then Paul was being redundant in Romans 8:29. You make it as though he said "For whom He did predestinate, He also did predestinate...".

legoman
Oct 8th 2008, 07:50 PM
I believe you are turning a word that is intended to mean "knowledge of something beforehand" into "to cause something to happen beforehand". You are making the word foreknowledge out to mean nothing different than the word predestination, but Paul indicates that the words mean something different by saying that those God foreknew He also predestined to be conformed to the image of Christ.

If to foreknow something and to predestine something mean the same thing then Paul was being redundant in Romans 8:29. You make it as though he said "For whom He did predestinate, He also did predestinate...".

Eric, you are missing the point. If something is foreknown, it is effectively predestined.

Here I will go step by step, and you can agree or disagree at each point.

1. God has complete foreknowledge, so he knows I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?

2. Therefore I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?

3. Therefore, at that moment in time tomorrow, it is not possible I will do anything other than event A. Agree?

4. Therefore we know with 100% certainty that I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?

5. Therefore it has been 100% determined that I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?

6. Therefore it has been predestined that I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?


Legoman

drew
Oct 8th 2008, 07:52 PM
If God foreknows an event will happen, then that event will happen. Thats what foreknowledge means. Because God knows the event will happen, the event is destined to happen.

Therefore, the presence of foreknowledge of event A, means that event A is predestined.

Example: God knows tomorrow I will do A. Therefore tomorrow I will do A. I am destined to do A tomorrow.

God doesn't even need to predestine event A himself. The existence of his foreknowledge effectively predestines event A.
I know that Legoman knows that I take the contrary position, but I wish to re-iterate that while I truly understand the appeal of this argument, I believe it contains a subtle error. I confess that I will not take the time to make my case. I will simply refer the interested reader to search the web for "theological fatalism" - I think that is the right term.

Again, I used to be utterly convinced of the correctness of the exact argument that Legoman is putting forward. I know think it is incorrect. But please, do not assume I am the authority on such matters (as if that ever happens :D). Look up the arguments for yourself with an open mind.

drew
Oct 8th 2008, 08:08 PM
Eric, you are missing the point. If something is foreknown, it is effectively predestined.

Here I will go step by step, and you can agree or disagree at each point.

1. God has complete foreknowledge, so he knows I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?

2. Therefore I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?

3. Therefore, at that moment in time tomorrow, it is not possible I will do anything other than event A. Agree?

4. Therefore we know with 100% certainty that I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?

5. Therefore it has been 100% determined that I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?

6. Therefore it has been predestined that I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?


Legoman
All right, ya went and asked for it......:D

The following is material in a file on my computer. It was written 3 years and I cannot recall if it is mine in origin or copied from someone else. It may have been copied from William Lane Craig. In any event, here it is. I I know its not easy, but I think it speaks to the argument of Legoman:

The objector’s (in case Legoman) argument seems very strong but it ultimately rests on an error in identifying the fundamental reason for the logical contradiction that the argument points to. Remember that the objector argues that if God knows that agent A will freely undertake to do “x” at some point T in the future, A seems logically forced towards x as he moves forward through time. A’s freedom to do anything other than x at T seems to have been taken away from him.

However, the objector’s argument really gets it force from the fact that there can only be one future, not from the fact that God’s foreknowledge has any real constraining effect. In order to see that this is so, the following argument is provided.

The objector has no problem with the idea that free will actions of people plus the action of other physical laws and constraints will result in the generation of a single future. As of today, the content of tomorrow is unknown to me, but I can say that only one of the infinite number of possible futures will, in fact, be realized, will become actual. Today is July 14, 2005. Viewed from the perspective of yesterday, what will happen on July 14, 2005 is unknown. However, a key insight is the realization that, of all possible tomorrows, we can be assured that only one will become actual. This is an important constraint to bear in mind.

The error that the objector makes is to try to get away with playing two futures, effectively 2 actual futures, off against each other. Quite naturally, a violent sense of contradiction is the result since our Universe is such that only one future ever becomes actual. When the objector says “Suppose God knows that I will freely do x tomorrow”, he (the objector) is tacitly committing to a specific actual future. This is fundamentally what it means to argue “Suppose x is the case in respect to the future….”. Once one has made any kind of a supposition, it is simply illogical to then suppose something else that directly contradicts the content of the original supposition. And this is what the objector ends up doing when, after supposing one future, he then introduces the thought experiment about the agent’s trip through time and his seemingly fated rendez-vous with action x.

If I say “Suppose that my next car will be a Ford”, I cannot then introduce a supposition that my next car will be a Mazda. It is in the very nature of suppositions to rule out other possibilities – if we suppose things are a certain way, we cannot then suppose they are a different way (at least without withdrawing the original supposition).

Now some further clarification is required. The reader may object to my claim that the objector is “committing” to a specific actual future. After all, the future, by its very nature “hasn’t happened yet” and there are indeed an infinite number of possible futures. I will simply reply by saying that the objector’s argument is effectively that “A cannot do freely do y if God knows A will freely do x”. This clearly entails a supposition that A will indeed do x. Read the objectors statement carefully. The objector is not saying “….A could freely do x”, he is saying that “A will freely do x”. I submit that a reader raising this objection is being seduced by the infinite number of possible futures and forgetting that only one of them will become actual and that the objector has indeed committed to one of them (by means of his supposition).

So at the end of the day, the objector is effectively asking us to accept one particular future as the one that will become actual and then asking us to engage in a thought experiment wherein a second future is explored specifically in respect to its candidacy to become actual. This is effectively to demand that 2 different futures can become actual and we know that this cannot be so.

The objector effectively wants to have his cake and eat it too.

legoman
Oct 8th 2008, 08:47 PM
All right, ya went and asked for it......:D

The following is material in a file on my computer. It was written 3 years and I cannot recall if it is mine in origin or copied from someone else. It may have been copied from William Lane Craig. In any event, here it is. I I know its not easy, but I think it speaks to the argument of Legoman:

The objector’s (in case Legoman) argument seems very strong but it ultimately rests on an error in identifying the fundamental reason for the logical contradiction that the argument points to. Remember that the objector argues that if God knows that agent A will freely undertake to do “x” at some point T in the future, A seems logically forced towards x as he moves forward through time. A’s freedom to do anything other than x at T seems to have been taken away from him.

However, the objector’s argument really gets it force from the fact that there can only be one future, not from the fact that God’s foreknowledge has any real constraining effect. In order to see that this is so, the following argument is provided.

The objector has no problem with the idea that free will actions of people plus the action of other physical laws and constraints will result in the generation of a single future. As of today, the content of tomorrow is unknown to me, but I can say that only one of the infinite number of possible futures will, in fact, be realized, will become actual. Today is July 14, 2005. Viewed from the perspective of yesterday, what will happen on July 14, 2005 is unknown. However, a key insight is the realization that, of all possible tomorrows, we can be assured that only one will become actual. This is an important constraint to bear in mind.

The error that the objector makes is to try to get away with playing two futures, effectively 2 actual futures, off against each other. Quite naturally, a violent sense of contradiction is the result since our Universe is such that only one future ever becomes actual. When the objector says “Suppose God knows that I will freely do x tomorrow”, he (the objector) is tacitly committing to a specific actual future. This is fundamentally what it means to argue “Suppose x is the case in respect to the future….”. Once one has made any kind of a supposition, it is simply illogical to then suppose something else that directly contradicts the content of the original supposition. And this is what the objector ends up doing when, after supposing one future, he then introduces the thought experiment about the agent’s trip through time and his seemingly fated rendez-vous with action x.

If I say “Suppose that my next car will be a Ford”, I cannot then introduce a supposition that my next car will be a Mazda. It is in the very nature of suppositions to rule out other possibilities – if we suppose things are a certain way, we cannot then suppose they are a different way (at least without withdrawing the original supposition).

Now some further clarification is required. The reader may object to my claim that the objector is “committing” to a specific actual future. After all, the future, by its very nature “hasn’t happened yet” and there are indeed an infinite number of possible futures. I will simply reply by saying that the objector’s argument is effectively that “A cannot do freely do y if God knows A will freely do x”. This clearly entails a supposition that A will indeed do x. Read the objectors statement carefully. The objector is not saying “….A could freely do x”, he is saying that “A will freely do x”. I submit that a reader raising this objection is being seduced by the infinite number of possible futures and forgetting that only one of them will become actual and that the objector has indeed committed to one of them (by means of his supposition).

So at the end of the day, the objector is effectively asking us to accept one particular future as the one that will become actual and then asking us to engage in a thought experiment wherein a second future is explored specifically in respect to its candidacy to become actual. This is effectively to demand that 2 different futures can become actual and we know that this cannot be so.

The objector effectively wants to have his cake and eat it too.

Hi drew,

I thank you for taking the time to dig this out. At first glance, I don't think what the author is saying about suggesting 2 futures is correct (having cake and eating it too). In fact that is the premise for the other thread - there is only one timeline (one future) - the one that God knows. I will have to study what you posted more as it is sufficently wordy and not easy to digest without some thought.

I am thinking that the error is perhaps in the above arguement where it says "the future has not been written yet", yet from God's perspective the whole timeline is written. So we think we can change the future, but God has already seen the future.

The argument on the suppositions and 2 "actual" futures is a bit cloudy. If God knows I will do X, then I cannot do Y. No contradiction. All that is saying is: if in the actual future I will do X, then there cannot be another "actual" future where I would have done Y. There is only one future. There could be infinite possible other futures, but they never come to pass. And we are not free to choose any of those other possible futures.

Perhaps you can present your argument in a simpler step-by-step format like my 6 points above. Or perhaps you can respond directly to the 6 points above and show the error in the logic.

I am truly perplexed by this, as to me the logic seems solid. If there truly is an error in those 6 steps, please show it to me plainly.

Thanks,
Legoman

BrckBrln
Oct 8th 2008, 08:49 PM
All right, ya went and asked for it......:D

The following is material in a file on my computer. It was written 3 years and I cannot recall if it is mine in origin or copied from someone else. It may have been copied from William Lane Craig. In any event, here it is. I I know its not easy, but I think it speaks to the argument of Legoman:

The objector’s (in case Legoman) argument seems very strong but it ultimately rests on an error in identifying the fundamental reason for the logical contradiction that the argument points to. Remember that the objector argues that if God knows that agent A will freely undertake to do “x” at some point T in the future, A seems logically forced towards x as he moves forward through time. A’s freedom to do anything other than x at T seems to have been taken away from him.

However, the objector’s argument really gets it force from the fact that there can only be one future, not from the fact that God’s foreknowledge has any real constraining effect. In order to see that this is so, the following argument is provided.

The objector has no problem with the idea that free will actions of people plus the action of other physical laws and constraints will result in the generation of a single future. As of today, the content of tomorrow is unknown to me, but I can say that only one of the infinite number of possible futures will, in fact, be realized, will become actual. Today is July 14, 2005. Viewed from the perspective of yesterday, what will happen on July 14, 2005 is unknown. However, a key insight is the realization that, of all possible tomorrows, we can be assured that only one will become actual. This is an important constraint to bear in mind.

The error that the objector makes is to try to get away with playing two futures, effectively 2 actual futures, off against each other. Quite naturally, a violent sense of contradiction is the result since our Universe is such that only one future ever becomes actual. When the objector says “Suppose God knows that I will freely do x tomorrow”, he (the objector) is tacitly committing to a specific actual future. This is fundamentally what it means to argue “Suppose x is the case in respect to the future….”. Once one has made any kind of a supposition, it is simply illogical to then suppose something else that directly contradicts the content of the original supposition. And this is what the objector ends up doing when, after supposing one future, he then introduces the thought experiment about the agent’s trip through time and his seemingly fated rendez-vous with action x.

If I say “Suppose that my next car will be a Ford”, I cannot then introduce a supposition that my next car will be a Mazda. It is in the very nature of suppositions to rule out other possibilities – if we suppose things are a certain way, we cannot then suppose they are a different way (at least without withdrawing the original supposition).

Now some further clarification is required. The reader may object to my claim that the objector is “committing” to a specific actual future. After all, the future, by its very nature “hasn’t happened yet” and there are indeed an infinite number of possible futures. I will simply reply by saying that the objector’s argument is effectively that “A cannot do freely do y if God knows A will freely do x”. This clearly entails a supposition that A will indeed do x. Read the objectors statement carefully. The objector is not saying “….A could freely do x”, he is saying that “A will freely do x”. I submit that a reader raising this objection is being seduced by the infinite number of possible futures and forgetting that only one of them will become actual and that the objector has indeed committed to one of them (by means of his supposition).

So at the end of the day, the objector is effectively asking us to accept one particular future as the one that will become actual and then asking us to engage in a thought experiment wherein a second future is explored specifically in respect to its candidacy to become actual. This is effectively to demand that 2 different futures can become actual and we know that this cannot be so.

The objector effectively wants to have his cake and eat it too.

Can you simplify this because I don't have a clue about what it's talking about.

drew
Oct 8th 2008, 09:00 PM
Can you simplify this because I don't have a clue about what it's talking about.
:D:D:D

Oh man. I do not know if I can simplify it, but I will try. If it is any consolation to you, I practically went insane on this issue several years back. Unfortunately, sometimes things are inherently complex. But if time allows, I will see what I can do.

John146
Oct 8th 2008, 09:21 PM
Eric, you are missing the point. If something is foreknown, it is effectively predestined.According to you. I'm not missing your point. I'm disagreeing with it.


Here I will go step by step, and you can agree or disagree at each point.

1. God has complete foreknowledge, so he knows I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?Yes


2. Therefore I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?Yes


3. Therefore, at that moment in time tomorrow, it is not possible I will do anything other than event A. Agree?It depends on how you look at it. From God's point of view, it's not possible that you would do anything besides event A because He already knows what you're going to do. This doesn't mean He predetermined for you to do event A. He just knows you're going to do it. From His perspective, you will do it tomorrow only because He already knows that beforehand.

But, from your perspective in the realm of time, you may do event A or you may not. The choice is yours. You have no knowledge yet of what you're going to choose to do and therefore you are not able to look at this the way God does. What you do tomorrow is your choice and God's foreknowledge of what you will do is not what determines what choice you will make.


4. Therefore we know with 100% certainty that I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?No, we don't know that. Only God knows what you will do. The choice is still yours because we are in the realm of time while God is outside of it.


5. Therefore it has been 100% determined that I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?No. Knowing what will happen beforehand and predetermining something to happen beforehand is not the same thing. This should be obvious.


6. Therefore it has been predestined that I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?No. Foreknowledge and predestination are not the same thing.

legoman
Oct 9th 2008, 01:07 AM
1. God has complete foreknowledge, so he knows I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?
Yes



2. Therefore I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?
Yes


3. Therefore, at that moment in time tomorrow, it is not possible I will do anything other than event A. Agree?
It depends on how you look at it. From God's point of view, it's not possible that you would do anything besides event A because He already knows what you're going to do. This doesn't mean He predetermined for you to do event A. He just knows you're going to do it. From His perspective, you will do it tomorrow only because He already knows that beforehand.

But, from your perspective in the realm of time, you may do event A or you may not. The choice is yours. You have no knowledge yet of what you're going to choose to do and therefore you are not able to look at this the way God does. What you do tomorrow is your choice and God's foreknowledge of what you will do is not what determines what choice you will make.


Ok this is where you contradict yourself. You are not making logical sense. How can it be known I will do A yet I won't do it?!? You agree with point 2 that I will do A. But then here in point 3 you say it is possible that I won't do A?

Sure there is an illusion that I could pick something other than A. But God knows I will do A. Thats all free will is, its an illusion.




4. Therefore we know with 100% certainty that I will do event A tomorrow. Agree?
No, we don't know that. Only God knows what you will do. The choice is still yours because we are in the realm of time while God is outside of it.
Fine. You do realize I was meaning "we" in the sense of us discussing this post. Of course in real life we don't know what God's foreknowledge is. :rolleyes:

I will reword point 4 more generally:

4. Therefore it is known with 100% certainty that I will do event A tomorrow.

5 and 6 follow as written.

But for some reason you don't believe it. I guess God has not destined you to give up your illusion of free will yet.

Now if it is known by someone I will do A tomorrow (even though I don't know it), there is nothing I can do to stop it. It is already determined because God knows it. Even though I don't know it yet. From the perspective of God, he has already determined that, through his foreknowledge. If something is determined it is effectively predestined.




No. Knowing what will happen beforehand and predetermining something to happen beforehand is not the same thing. This should be obvious.

No. Foreknowledge and predestination are not the same thing.Think about it. If it is known that something will happen beforehand, then it must happen, it is already determined to happen, because of the foreknowledge. Sure we don't know what the foreknowledge is, so we don't know what will happen, but God does have the foreknowledge. So the very fact that God has the foreknowledge means that what he knows must happen, and it will happen!

How can you deny that?

BroRog
Oct 9th 2008, 01:47 AM
I am thinking that the error is perhaps in the above arguement where it says "the future has not been written yet", yet from God's perspective the whole timeline is written. So we think we can change the future, but God has already seen the future.

This is correct, if God knows the future, the future has the same fixity as the past.

John146
Oct 10th 2008, 02:07 AM
Ok this is where you contradict yourself. You are not making logical sense.And you are not making logical sense to me. Oh, well. I think I'll still sleep well at night. ;)


How can it be known I will do A yet I won't do it?!?You're not making much of an effort to understand my point of view. If we did somehow know what you will do tomorrow, then of course we'd know that you will do it. But the fact is, since we are humans in the realm of time and space, we don't know what you're going to do in the future.


Sure there is an illusion that I could pick something other than A. But God knows I will do A. Thats all free will is, its an illusion.So far you haven't shown that God knowing what will happen is the same as God predetermining what will happen.


Fine. You do realize I was meaning "we" in the sense of us discussing this post. Of course in real life we don't know what God's foreknowledge is. :rolleyes:But I guess you don't care much for speaking in real life terms. :rolleyes:


I will reword point 4 more generally:

4. Therefore it is known with 100% certainty that I will do event A tomorrow.If God told you that you will do event A tomorrow then we would be 100% certain that you would do event A. But, once again, this would not mean that God predetermined for you to do event A. He is able to tell you what you will do because He knows beforehand.


5 and 6 follow as written.

But for some reason you don't believe it. I guess God has not destined you to give up your illusion of free will yet.Immature insults don't add much to the discussion, I'm afraid.


Now if it is known by someone I will do A tomorrow (even though I don't know it), there is nothing I can do to stop it. It is already determined because God knows it.No, it is already known. How does an event being known beforehand turn into that event being determined (caused to happen) beforehand? That's quite a leap in logic.


Even though I don't know it yet. From the perspective of God, he has already determined that, through his foreknowledge. If something is determined it is effectively predestined. This is what you don't seem to understand. Our disagreement comes from having different definitions of the term foreknowledge. You want to insist that I agree with your definition. Using your definition, which I disagree with, what you're saying would make sense. But since I disagree with your definition of that term, what you're saying does not make sense to me.


Think about it. If it is known that something will happen beforehand, then it must happen, it is already determined to happen, because of the foreknowledge. It is known what will happen, but that does not necessitate that it was predetermined to happen that way.


Sure we don't know what the foreknowledge is, so we don't know what will happen, but God does have the foreknowledge. So the very fact that God has the foreknowledge means that what he knows must happen, and it will happen!

How can you deny that?I'm not denying anything. I'm disagreeing with your definition of the term foreknowledge. That's where the disagreement comes in.

BroRog
Oct 10th 2008, 05:44 AM
John,

Quick question.

If God knows what you will do in the future, can you say that it is impossible for you to die until then?

RoadWarrior
Oct 10th 2008, 08:00 PM
This thread is being closed. The OP is a non-Christian, and needs to be asking their questions in Christians Answer.